ea~e processes. It is fair to' say that more medical negligence claims fail in the investigation of causation than for want of a breach-of-duty.
In no area has this difficulty for the claimant been more starkly illustrated than in claims arising from delays in the diagnosis of cancer. All instinct suggests that delay in diagnosis must lead to a poorer outcome.
Lawyers are simple souls and the tort of negligence is a flexible and widely adapted tool in their hands. Clinicians, however, may think it too close to a flint axe. That the principles of foreseeability derived from the breakdown of a duty between a ginger beer manufacturcr and its consumer can be applied to the infinitely more complex problems of a doctor-patient relationship may seem to clinicians to have more to do with the ingenuity and persuasiveness of lawyers than the application of clinical standards. Nevertheless, the surprise is that adapted in this way, the law of negligence not only works but that it does so with a degree of success. A damages bill of more than £100 million per annum suggests that this tool is reasonably well honed.
Whilst motivations are difficult to measure entirely, it is common ground that patient expectations are higher than ever because of advances in medicine. When that medicine fails to fulfil its promise, however, or when human fallibility intervenes, people nowadays seek redress through lawyers. This may be evidence of a more consumerist attitude amongst members of the public, but whatever the nature of this shift in attitude, it affects not only doctors but all professional mcn and women, whatever job they do. The 19l)Os should be seen as the decade in which worldwide, consumers started to hold professional men and women to account for their actions and inactions. Perhaps this is the final expression of what Christopher Ncwdick calls the second phase in the development of the law of tort; the utmost extension of the neighbour principle.
Tracing back the developments that have got us this far, the relative lack of sophistication of medical litigation in the early 19HOs probably arose from an attitude carried over from road traffic and works accident claims, which regarded the evidence required to show " more medical negligence claims Jail in the investigation oj causation thanJor want oja breach-of-duty. "
To the legal mind, such a delay can be characterized as an omission, and the causation question then to be answered is whether that delay has caused an injury. In likelihood, however, as Dischc, Bentzen and Bond point out in their papLT, this delay may have only a limited influence on the eventual outcome, Diagnosis of a malignancy whilst it is localized may lead to a better outcome; the fact that the 'delay' is judged to have arisen between the time when the cancer became clinically apparent and its first examination by a doctor is to lose sight of the much more longterm and subtle disease process that is involved. As Dischc, Bentzen and Bond point out, the reduction in the probability of CUlT in the majority of cases is more modest (in the rangc of 20-.30'Yt,) than the >5ll'Yt, required by lawyers to satisfy the test of probability.
So far, appellate courts have been resistant to the idea that loss of a chance, as understood in the commcrcial context, can be applied to medical cases. A growing clinical acceptance of the interplay between delay and a reduction in probable curl', however, should persuade a court that even if a curl' might not have been probable, the fact of having lost the chance of a curl' should be grounds for limited reCOVLTy. This seems a relatively modest and logical step rather than the last great problem seemingly identified in the speeches in Hotson l' East Berkshire Health AI/thority.:'.
"So far, appellate courts have been resistant to the idea that loss of a chance, as understood in the commercial context, can be applied to medical cases. "
Our other contributors, Sir Christopher Paine and Dr jeffrey Tobias, turn their attention to the way in which claims are brought. They highlight two recent multiparty actions involving claims arising from radiotherapy treatment.
Everyone acknowledges that the court systcm is far from perfect either as a means of determining claims or of ensuring the lessons from those claims are widely advertized, However, there arc grounds for optimism that the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules, and in particular, the Pre-action Protocol for clinical negligence claims, will see cases dealt with more speedily and less rigidly than in the past.
What the new Civil Procedure Rules do not tell us is whether they will be better able to accommodate those demanding actions that test the tort system's capacity to determine contests of clinical judgment. The articles by Paine and Tobias highlight the difficulties in establishing fault and causation in radiothcrapy claims and offer a number of instructive insights into this dilemma. Both authors reflect upon the Exeter radiotherapy claims and the RAGE litigation and the lessons that need to be learned. To the lawyer, the main distinction that these cases illustrate is between truly generic litigation. in which all claimants have experienced the same breach-of-duty, and cases with similar injuries whose genesis may lie in commonly and (allegedly) wrongly held clinical attitudes, but which are not truly genLTic.
" ... there are __ groundsfov optimism that the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules, and in particular, the Pre-action Protocol for clinical negligence claims, will see cases dealt with more speedily and less rigidly than in the past. "
In retrospect, the differences between the Exeter and RAGE (Rndiothcrapv Action Group Exposure) cases are VLTy clear, and the temptation is to rush to judgment in concluding that the many individual claims that were grouped together in the RAGE litigation had no reason to be heard together, or at all. The position at the outset is, of course. much more complicated, as anyone who has ever experienced the beginnings of a group action will know. At the early stage, it is easy to believe that a number of different issues can be considered generic, and this view may continue even after expert advice has been received, It may only be once litigation has progressed towards trial that the lack of a truly gencric core to the claims is established. By the time that happens, the cost-sharing provisions in the case, allied to the critical mass of claims, may make it very difficult for those claims to be separated from one another. There is a temptation to wait and sec if the individual claims themselves may attract offers, which would make it possible for a global settlement to take place, This scenario has often been the case in group pharmaceutical actions in the past.
In recent times, judges have seen increasing merit in creating generic groups of cases in an effort to reduce the cost of trying complex technical evidence. What has never been done is to establish terms on which painless 'degcnLTicizing' of these actions might take place. The prcssurc from defendants for this not to happen is intense, "Ultimately, even in the most complex  clinical cases, the responsibility of  assessing the appropriate standard of care,  where an allegation of a breach of that  standard is made, falls to the court and  not to the experts. " CLINICAL RISK 3
The criticisms of litigation ansmg from radiotherapy treatment posed by Sir Christopher and Dr Tobias articulate a rather narrow clinical attitude. There seems to be incomprehension as to why litigation is brought, and emphasis is laid on the difficulty of establishing a proper level of practice against which the criticisms levelled by the claims can be judged. The suggestion that the lack of agreement as to what constitutes standard treatment might be a reason to shirk the task of external verification or assessment is clinically inward (if not backward) looking. Ultimately, even in the most complex clinical cases, the responsibility of assessing the appropriate standard of care, where an allegation of a breach of that standard is made, falls to the court and not to the experts.
"Satisfaction at claimants' inability to meet a strict causation test in a courtroom
should be no basis for applauding a defensive attitude. "
What I think Sir Christopher and Dr Tobias forget in their critical analysis of the RAGE litigation is the powerful dissatisfaction of those who underwent radiotherapy treatment and experienced unforeseen and unpleasant outcomes, and those patients whose expectations had not been met. Satisfaction at claimants' inability to meet a strict causation test in a courtroom should be no basis for applauding a defensive attitude. The concern should be to ask why people felt strongly enough to bring claims at all.
Medical litigation shows no signs of going away, despite the best efforts of the MDO (Medical Defence Organisation) and the NHSLA (National Health Service Litigation Authority). Rather, it is broadening its sphere, and increasing numbers of clinicians, hitherto unaffected, see their practice being affected by it. Relatively few claims are actually litigated at trial, but the effect of settlements and the anecdotal evidence provided to colleagues by those who act as experts show lawyers challenging a few items of received wisdom. This also occurs in evidence-based medicine and new research, as they emerge to take practice forward.
Within its own limited sector, litigation can and does have a disproportionate effect upon clinical practice. Perhaps, following Professor Dischc's findings. lawyers will find a way of expressing in damages the value of a lost chance of a better outcome. If radiotherapy patients' treatment becomes more consistent all round, and patients expectations are more properly managed, then perhaps there may have been success in the RAG E litigation after all.
"Within its own limited sector, litigation can and does have a disproportionate~[fect upon clinical practice. "
Doctors' failure to meet rising patient expectations is a key motivation for those who resort to medical litigation. When some of those expectations become rights in October 2()()(), the patient-driven pressure for change may surprise clinicians.
